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Abstract 
Existence of good institutions plays a very important role in 
economic performance. Though the term ‗institutions‘ covers a very wide 
spectrum, this paper considers the legal aspect and extent of state 
intervention as important components of institutions. However political 
institution has also been identified as an important factor that affects 
industrial growth and development. This paper empirically examines the 
significance of these factors in explaining variations in the per capita GDP of 
the Indian states and the extent of industrial development across them. The 
study further uses the different indices of institutions for a comparative 
analysis among the states with reference to Jharkhand. Empirical findings 
suggest that the extent of state intervention is significant in explaining the 
variations in State Gross Domestic Product (SGDP) growth whereas legal 
institutions and political institutions both play a highly significant role in 
explaining variations in the extent of industrial development across the 
Indian states. 
 
Keywords: Institutions, Governance, Rule of Law, Legal Efficiency, 
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Introduction 
Development economics of different countries or different states tries 
to find out the answer of a basic question why different countries or different 
states within a country grow differently resulting into different degrees of 
income inequalities. Ayami (1997) discusses the cross country comparison 
and finds that governance and institutions which are country-specific factors, 
play a dominant role in determining the growth of a country. 
 Even countries with similar resource endowments have experienced 
sharply different economic growth because of country-specific governance 
and organizations. Examples are North Korea versus South Korea, Kenya 
versus Tanzania, and India versus Pakistan. 
 A well maintained setup of institutions encourages components of 
economic development to participate in fair and productive economic 
activities and discourages rent-seeking and illegal activities in an economy. 
Poor institutions force the economy to a low-level equilibrium due to the 
disincentives created by the non productive role of the economic agents 
(Dash and Raja, 2009). The literature that focuses on the role of a 
government or state maintains that the interventionist activity of the state 
influences the economic outcomes to a considerable extent (Buchanan and 
Tabellini, 2005) .The enforcement of efficient legal institutions, protection of 
property rights and well-enforced rule of law have been recognized as 
prerequisite for economic prosperity. 
 The role of a state is gauged by two important performers : the 
existing quality of governance and the extent of state intervention in 
economic activities. The quality of governance can be judged by the 
enforcement of the rule of law, fiscal management, and expenditures on 
development-related activities (Schaefer and Raja, 2006). It is found that the 
state acts as a grabbing hand rather than a helping hand; it redistributes and 
appropriates the wealth instead of generating and protecting it. Thus, due to 
its self-interested character, if the governments were given policy powers 
that influenced the market, it would fail to bring about effective economic 
development (Kaufmann et.al., 2002).The political institutions of a nation 
determine its economic outcomes indirectly by influencing economic 
institutions (Acemoglu et.al., 2001). A politically unstable society makes 
investments risky and uncertain by frequently changing the Government and 
its decisions. Political instability discourages investments and productive 
economic activities (Barro, 1991, Alesina et.al., 1996, Brunetti and Weder, 
1998, and Svensson, 1998). 
 Empirical findings suggest that the extent of state intervention is 
significant in explaining the variations in state‘s SGDP growth whereas legal 
institutions and political institutions both play a significant role in explaining 
variations in the extent of industrialization across the states. The study 
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further uses the formulated indices of institutions for a comparative analysis 
among the states considered with reference to Jharkhand. 
 
Brief Introduction of Jharkhand 
 Jharkhand is the newly carved out resource rich state in India, having 
immense potential for industrialization endowing large deposits of minerals, 
which may prove to be a launching pad for various industries. Around 40 
percent of the total minerals are available in Jharkhand. The State is the 
exclusive producer of cooking coal, pyrite and uranium.  It ranks first in the 
production of coal, mica, copper and kyanite in India.  
 It is the country‘s most mineral rich state, with mining and quarrying 
accounting for 14.3 percent of the GSDP (as compared to 2.3 percent for the 
rest of India), and manufacturing for 27 percent (as compared to only 17 
percent for all India in 2004). Forestry, from which the state derives its 
name, contributes only about 1.3 percent of the GSDP. It is interesting to 
note that the shares of industry, agriculture and services have remained more 
or less constant and hence the growth of the state has come to a hault, over 
the last 10 years, with industry contributing nearly 50 percent and both 
agriculture and services sector contributing 22 percent and 28 percent 
respectively year after year (Figure 1.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation 
Figure 1.1- Sectoral Shares in GSDP 
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―The level of industrialization has not translated into high levels of income 
for the state‖. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation 
Figure 1.2-Growth Gap between Jharkhand and rest of India 
 
The gap between the growth of income between Jharkhand and the 
rest of India has been widening as the state‘s per capita income has grown 
only at 3.4 percent per annum compared to 4.8 percent for all India between 
1993/94 and 2003/04 (Figure-1.2).
  
 Jharkhand has the major industrial activity in large and medium 
sector in the state, which so far has taken place in Chotanagpur region. 
Considerable investments have been made both in public and private sector 
in basic and heavy industries during previous planning periods with marginal 
spread effects in the state. All these facts though might suggest a pleasant 
state of affairs but in Jharkhand, nearly 80% large and medium scale 
industries is seen in districts of Hazaribagh, Dhanbad, Bokaro, Ranchi and 
Purbi Singhbhum which also cumulatively accounts to 68% of the state 
urban population reflecting that the industrial development is limited and 
confined to the Chotanagpur region and is almost untouched for the Santhal 
Pargana region which is also having a huge mineral base. The state has 
experienced a modest growth rate of 2.4 percent per year in GSDP over the 
last decade, as estimated from the NSS survey. With one of the highest levels 
of poverty incidence in India, the state needs to accelerate the overall growth 
rate.  
 
Organisation of the Paper 
 The paper is organized as follows: the following section is devoted to 
a discussion of the literature on the role of institutions and the quality of 
governance in Indian context and identifies the gaps that this study attempts 
to fill. The third section describes the objectives of this study. The fourth 
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section contains data and the methodology used. The fifth section contains 
the empirical analysis and the results. The sixth section contains the 
discussion of the results and the conclusion. 
 
The literature review 
The significant positive role of the institutions on the economic 
development have been established by a number of cross-country empirical 
studies in explaining the disparity in growth rate and standards of quality of 
life across different countries over a time (Aron, 2000; Rodrik et.al., 2004; 
Hall and Jones, 1999; Clague et.al., 1999; Svensson, 1998; Levine, 1998; La 
Porta et.al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995 and 1997; Barro, 
1991 and 1996; Scully and Slottje, 1991). 
 According to Chong and Calderon (2000), a country‘s institutional 
framework is an important factor for not only its economic performance but 
also the way, how income is distributed among its members. In many 
researches, information regarding the quality of institutions is generally 
taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI). 
 Most of the abovementioned studies suggest that economic 
performance can be guaranteed only when a country-specific institution is 
adopted successfully. 
 
Institutions and Governance in India 
Many scholars have linked institutions with economic outcomes from 
different perspectives. Douglas North (1989 and 1990) finds that the 
institutions are country-specific and they determine the level of future 
economic growth of the country, whereas scholars such as Bardhan (2004 
and 2005) are more concerned about the problems caused by the existing 
dysfunctional institutions and their persistence in underdeveloped countries 
or states.  
 The quantification of institutions in India was undertaken in a study 
by Subramanian (2007) in which the legal efficiency, rule of law and 
customs administration were taken as indicators of institutional quality or 
institutional outcomes. The broad conclusion is that the core institutions of 
democracy and an independent judiciary have created the prerequisite for 
economic growth, but that India could get this growth only after a proper 
policy orientation. 
 The role of institutional qualities in promoting economic growth are 
significant factors across the Indian states  has begun to gain the attention of 
scholars only recently.  Most of the studies centred on the economic 
performance across Indian states, only suggest that there is a variation in the 
institutional quality but they haven‘t been tested statistically. The study 
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performed by Indicus Analytics (2004) and  Debroy and Bhandari (2004) are 
limited to the ranking of the states or whether that ranking has changed 
during different time periods for the purpose of  investment attractiveness, 
but the significance of the institutions has not been  tested over economic 
performance. Various institutional indices,  are calculated  based on a 
perception survey. Development indicators, such as the level of 
industrialization, also show a high variation. 
 Fiscal governance plays an important role in promoting economic 
growth. But when fiscal governance is measured by fiscal deficit, it may not 
be a good indicator as it is not directly linked to the level of development of 
the states and as because the poorer states showing revenue surpluses and 
small fiscal deficits actually did so by sacrificing or compromising on 
development expenditures (Rao, 2005). Bhide, Chadha and Kalirajan (2005) 
while  assessing the overall growth across Indian states found institutional 
quality play a significant role. However, the proxy for institutions that is 
used is the state growth rate (SGDP). This is based on the assumption that 
states having a higher growth are also the ones with better institutions.  
 The number of studies conducted is very few on India and Indian 
states, if  the country-specific institutions and economic performance is 
concerned at a broader regional level.  
 
Institutions and Industrial Performance in India 
 Poor institutions can restrict the economy from using efficient 
production techniques, whjch in turn would  force the country to remain at 
the ‗low-equilibrium‘ trap with low per capita income for a long time, which 
is the case in India until recently (Dreze and Sen, 1997). 
 Several interesting questions are raised based on this argument, about 
India's productive efficiency, technological progress and overall growth 
process during the pre-reform period of 1991. It may be noticed that the 
government industrial policy did not produce the expected results of 
increasing employment and reducing the interregional income disparity, 
though the industrial output increased as discussed by Rosen (1992). 
 To study the role of institutional qualities on the industrial 
performance it is necessary to understand the growth path followed by India 
over a number of years since independence. The basic organisational setup 
followed in India for its industrialisation process has been the heavy 
dependence on public sector units and a limited entry for new private sector 
firms and also to stop expansion of existing firms in the production of low 
priority areas. Capital goods such as Steel and Cement were given to public 
sector enterprises, while consumer goods and other low priority production 
were given to private sector. Public sector industries instead of making 
profits have in fact accumulated huge losses over the years. As a result, 
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instead of being a source of reinvestible surplus, they have become only a 
source of liability to the economy. Lack of profitability in the public sector 
has been partly the result of a low rate of capacity utilization. 
 In conclusion, it may be stated that most of the study of institutions 
and economic performance across the Indian states has only been done with 
a view to ranking the Indian states and observing whether this ranking has 
stayed over time or changed. The use of perceptional indices, however, has 
many problems associated with it and may not give an accurate picture. The 
question of whether the perceptional indices correlate with the prevailing 
ideas on the institution-economic development linkage has not been studied 
so far. Using fiscal deficit as an indicator of fiscal governance would also 
show misleading results; hence, under index of fiscal governance, different 
variables are required to be considered. This paper is an attempt to answer 
these issues and raise striking questions on the role of governance and the 
linkages between institutions and economic performance.  
 
Objectives of the study 
Most of the earlier research works, on institutions and economic 
performance across the Indian states, have been performed either with a view 
to ranking the states or to observe whether this ranking has changed over 
time. Though the method using perception indices has many problems 
associated with it, however whether these indices correlate significantly with 
the economic development, has not been studied so far. This study is as an 
attempt to fill this gap and raise pertinent questions on role of different 
institutions in economic performance. Consequently the following objectives 
are framed- 
1. To study the role of different components of institutions in economic 
performance of the Indian states, analysing the significance levels using 
multiple OLS Regression techniques. 
2. To comparatively analyse the economic performance of the Indian states, 
with reference to Jharkhand, based on the different indices of institutions 
formulated. 
 
The data and methodology 
In this paper four  most economically developed  Indian states  have 
been considered  from each of the four zones of India namely West Bengal  
from East Zone, Maharashtra from West Zone, Punjab from North Zone  and 
Tamilnadu  from South Zone and  a comparison has been made with 
reference to Jharkhand. In this process various proxies are used to find out 
how significant is the components of the Institutions-i) Legal institutions,  ii) 
State intervention as an institutions and iii) Political Institutions, over three 
dimensions of economic development namely per capita income, percentage 
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growth in SGDP and level of industrialisation, which are collected from 
various secondary data sources. To perform this cross-sectional study, data 
for the time period of seven years (from 2004-05 to 20010-11) have been 
collected. Seven proxies of institutions are used to capture three dimensions 
of the institutional aspects in the economic activities. This paper formulates 
institutional indices based on secondary data for the time period of seven 
years (from 2004-05 to 2010-11) and uses statistical methods to test the 
hypothesis that institutions affect economic performance. This method 
however ignores the issues that are associated with obtaining information 
that is perception-based.  
 The common problem for such type of cross-section analysis is 
multicollinearity. Principal component analysis (PCA) is used to solve this 
problem. PCA is applied to the proxies who are having high correlation 
amongst each other. Since the units of measurement of different correlated 
variables are different, the rotated correlation matrix is used to get the 
corresponding weight. 
 
 
After standardizing the data, it is multiplied with the weight as 
suggested by PCA to arrive at the corresponding indices or composite 
indices. Finally, three principal components are retained which have 
extracted 93.8 percent of variance of the dataset. The obtained weights are 
multiplied by the corresponding standardized values of the variables to arrive 
at the indices.  
 Since the proxy of the Creditors‘ Property Rights Protection receives 
the highest weight in the first principal component, the resulting index is 
named the Index of Property Rights. The second highest weight in the first 
component is for Average Disposal rate of cases per court, for which the 
resulting index is named Index of Legal Efficiency.  
 Similarly, the second principal component suggests for  the three 
indices-named as i) the State as a provider of necessary infrastructure- a 
combination of two variables -named surfaced road as a proportion of total 
roads and percentage of households having access to a telephone , ii) Index 
of Economic Freedom-which is a measure of total Govt. Expenditure as a 
percentage of SGDP and iii) Index of Fiscal Governance- prepared 
combining two variables named revenue expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure and interest payment as a percentage of total expenditure. 
 The third principal component, which has the highest weight to 
Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Loss considered as a proxy for the 
Index of Rule of Law. The second highest weight in third component is for 
the number of times the president‘s rule imposed which when combined with 
the next highest value for coalition government generates the Index of 
Political Stability.  
European Scientific Journal   April 2014  edition vol.10, No.10   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
321 
 
 The resulting seven indices no longer have the problem of 
multicollinearity and can be used together in a regression equation. The 
details of the dependent and independent variables are discussed below. 
 
The Dependent Variables 
For better understanding and proper gauging the economic 
development of states, three dimensions of it are considered based upon the 
following justifications- 
 (i) Per capita state gross domestic product. This is an overall measure of 
economic development and is used routinely in many studies. The set of 
institutions is regressed over this variable and the results are discussed in 
Model-1. 
ii) Percentage SGDP growth rate among the states is the second variable 
considered. This is a measure of the comparative percentage growth year 
wise, of the state GDP, in different states, reflecting the economic growth 
rate. The set of institutions is regressed over this variable and the results are 
discussed in Model-2 
(iii) Index of industrial development is considered as the third variable 
because the extent of industrialization has significant linkage effects that 
influence the level of development. It is measured as the ratio of the 
contribution of the secondary sector to total state GDP. The set of institutions 
is regressed over this variable and the results are discussed in Model-3. 
 
Selection of the Proxies and the Formulation of the Indices to be 
referred for independent variables 
The components of institutions and the justified selection of the 
corresponding proxy variables are discussed in Table 1.1. 
 
 
Table 1.1:Institutions and the Selection of the Proxies 
Institutions Components of 
the Institutions 
Description of the Proxy Variables 
1.Legal 
Institutions 
1 a) Index of 
Legal Efficiency 
 
• Disposal rate of cases per court has been considered 
as a proxy which covers the efficiency level of the 
legal institutions. A higher value is an indication that 
pendency is less with a quicker disposal of cases 
resulting into prevention of productive activities. 
1 b) Index of 
Property Rights 
It is the measure of the degree of risk that banks face 
across the states. one of the aspects of property rights 
which is considered as a proxy for this study is the 
Credit-deposit ratio of commercial banks. The credit 
deposit (CD) ratio is a measure of the effectiveness of 
the credit delivery system. 
1 c) Index of - 
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Rule of Law This is a perception institution and most of the cross 
country studies have used the rule of law indices 
prepared by international agencies like ICRG, BERI 
and the World Bank. This study has used 
Transmission and distribution (T & D) loss as a 
percentage of total generation as a proxy for rule of 
law with the following justification- 
T & D losses occur due to two reasons- (i) loss due to 
transmission which is a technical phenomenon and (ii) 
loss due to theft which is mainly due to illegal 
connection of electricity from the transmission. If it is 
assumed that the loss due to technical reasons would 
be uniform throughout the state as the technology of 
generation and distribution does not vary significantly 
across the country. If the rule of law will be poorer, 
the probability of being caught will be very low and 
people will find that power theft is very easy. Hence 
this can be taken as a proxy for rule of law. 
2. State 
Intervention 
as an 
Institutions 
2 a) Index of 
Economic 
Freedom 
This index reflects the extent to which the state is 
involved in economic activities. The proxy considered 
for this index is the Ratio of total expenditure to state 
gross domestic product (SGDP).  A high value of the 
ratio of total expenditure to state gross domestic 
product (SGDP) shows greater extent of intervention 
of state in various economic activities which may 
result into more scope of corruption or rent seeking. 
 
2 b) Index of 
Fiscal 
Governance 
 
 
A poor fiscal governance may not attract the the 
private economic agents for the productive economic 
activities. Two proxy variables are considered to 
capture this index- 
(i)Revenue expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure- a high ratio value indicatesthat more 
resources are utilised for generating revenue which is 
redistributive for the development of the state.a low 
value indicates an inefficient utilization of the 
resources and a poorfiscal management. 
(ii) Interest payments as a percentage of total 
expenditure- if a large amount is devoted to the 
interest payments on debts, then few amount is left for 
the developmetal activities reflecting a poor fiscal 
management of the state. 
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2 c) Index of 
State as a 
provider of 
Necessary 
Infrastructure 
.The role of infrastructure in industrial development 
and hence in economic outcomes is well established 
by various studies. Two variables are considered to 
captyre this- 
(i) Ratio of surfaced (paved) roads to total roads. This 
indicates the quality of road infrastructure and a higher 
ratio represents the maintenance of good transport 
facilities by the state. A developed road infrastructure 
reduces the total transaction costs of economy by 
saving time and minimizing transportation costs, 
which attracts the investment projects. 
(ii)Percentage of the population accessing telephone 
connections. 
An efficient telecommunications system will reduce 
the costs of communication and will make transactions 
cheaper and quicker. 
3.Political 
Institutions 
Index of Political 
Stability 
 
Two variables are used in order to capture the political 
scenario of major Indian states. 
• Number of times the President‟s rule was imposed. 
The imposition of the President‘s rule indicates a poor 
political scenario in a state. President‘s rule is 
generally imposed when none of the political parties 
gets a majority or if the party in power fails to 
maintain law and order in the state. If this happens 
frequently, then a state will fail to attract economic 
investors and economic outcomes will always be 
unsatisfactory 
• Number of times the Chief Ministers headed a 
coalition form of government. The main problem with 
a coalition government is that it is not necessarily 
stable and mere for survival of the coalition 
government development in all fields are sacrificed by 
the politicians. Reversal of policies may create an 
environment whisc distracts the investment 
scenario.Hence a high value will suggest high degree 
of political instability resulting into less development 
 
Empirical analysis and the results 
Regression Results  
Multiple ordinary least squares regression analysis is used to analyse 
the statistical significance level of the different indices and to explain the 
variations in the different components of economic performance across the 
states. The results are discussed in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2: Regression Results 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
                                Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
PCI SGDP LID 
Index of Legal Efficiency 2.251 
(1.972)* 
-0.7319 
(-0.5716) 
-1.359 
(-2.346)** 
Index of Political Stability -1.844 
(-0.702) 
-1.997 
(-0.678) 
4.807 
(3.6068)*** 
Index of Rule of Law -5.326 
(-1.1969) 
8.755 
(1.754)* 
9.836 
(4.355)*** 
Index of Property Rights Protection -0.81055 
(-0.936) 
3.215 
(3.311)*** 
4.486 
(10.212)*** 
Index of State as a provider of infrastructure 
services 
-0.0888 
(-0.797) 
0.603 
(0.485) 
2.775 
(4.937)*** 
Index of Fiscal Governance -87.43 
(-1.518) 
178.89 
(2.769)** 
63.683 
(2.179)** 
Index of Economic Freedom 144.45 
(1.777)* 
-259.66 
(-2.848)*** 
-97.314 
(-2.359)** 
    
Intercept 17.079*** 
(5.635) 
7.038*** 
(8.173) 
15.06*** 
(24.424) 
    
R-Squared 0.677 0.5937 0.917 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.544 0.4264 0.883 
F-Statistics 5.094** 3.549* 26.776*** 
Degree of Freedom (7,5) (7,5) (7,5) 
    
 
Abbreviations: PCI: Per Capita Income, SGDP: Percentage Growth in State 
Gross Domestic Product, LID: Level of Industrial Development 
Notes: The figures below coefficient measures within parenthesis are the t-
statistics values 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
* Significant at 10% significance level 
 
 The estimated regression results, after regressing the indices of the 
set of institutions over the different components of economic performance 
are displayed in Table 1.2. 
 The results in Model 1 suggest that the State Per Capita Income has a 
low explanatory power as reflected by the low value of adjusted R
2
. This 
model explains only 66.7 percent variance in per capita income among the 
states. In this model most of the indices appear with negative sign except the 
Index of Legal Efficiency and Index of Economic Freedom though both have 
positive coefficient values but significant at 10 percent significance level. 
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In Model 2, it is observed that it is a weak model as reflected by the 
comparative low value of adjusted R
2
 which explains only 59.4 percent 
variations. The major finding of this model is the Index of Property Rights 
which is highly significant and the Index of Fiscal Governance which is 
significant at 10 percent significance level showing the positive correlation 
with the degree and quality of state intervention in economic performance. 
 In Model 3, the set of institutions are regressed over level of 
industrial development and it is found to be satisfying all the criteria of a 
good fit model with a very high explanatory power covering around 88.3 
percent variance in it. The Indices of Political Stability, Rule of Law, 
Property Rights and State Infrastructure do affect the level of industrial 
development and hence the overall economic performance of the states, 
suggested by the positive values of coefficients, is highly significant at 
1percent level of significance. In this model Index of Fiscal Governance is 
also significant at 10 percent level of significance showing that states cannot 
overlook or ignore this for a better level of industrialisation. 
 Surprisingly the Index of Legal Efficiency and Index of Economic 
Freedom both have negative signs in     Model 3, which is against the 
expectations but the values are significant at 5 percent level of significance 
suggesting these indices somehow do affect the level of industrial 
development in the states considered. 
 The intercept in all the three models are also highly significant 
suggesting the initial level of economic growth is positively influenced by 
the all the models considered and hence by all the components of 
institutions.                                                                      
  
Comparative Analysis of the Institutions at State Level with reference to 
Jharkhand 
Table 1.3 :Indices of Institutions by States 
STATES I_LEG_EF
FI 
I_POLI_ST
AB 
I_RUL
E_LA
W 
I_PROP_R
IGHT 
I_STA
TE_IN
FRA 
I_FISC
_GOV 
I_ECO
N_FRD
M 
JHARKHAND -0.055 0.090 0.085 -0.084 -0.139 0.002 0.003 
MAHARASHTRA 
0.027 -0.024 0.000 0.031 0.061 -0.007 -0.005 
PUNJAB -0.014 -0.019 -0.035 -0.008 0.155 0.004 0.002 
TAMILNADU -0.056 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.046 -0.001 0.000 
WEST BENGAL 0.037 -0.024 -0.009 -0.024 -0.161 0.005 0.001 
 
Abbreviations:  I_LEG_EFFI ,Index of Legal Efficiency; I_POLI_STAB, 
Index of Political Stability; I_RULE_LAW, Index of Rule of Law;  
I_PROP_RIGHT, Index of Creditors‘ Property Rights; I_STATE_INFRA, 
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Index of State as a provider of necessary Infrastructures;  I_FISC_GOV, 
Index of Fiscal Governance;  I_ECON_FRDM, Index of Economic Freedom 
 Comparative analysis of the states based on different indices of 
Institutions is presented in Table 1.3 and can be summarised, institution- 
wise as follows –  
 
Legal Efficiency - An efficient legal institution with a quicker disposal rate 
of cases can help to avoid economic loss and improve economic outcomes. 
Hence, a higher disposal rate is expected to be positively related with the 
economic performance. West Bengal has the highest value for this followed 
by Maharashtra and Punjab. Jharkhand has the one of the lowest value for 
this reflecting that the legal institutions are not in a satisfactory condition. 
 
Political Stability- Two variables are used in order to capture the index of 
political stability- Number of times the President‟s rule was imposed and 
number of times the Chief Ministers headed a coalition form of government. 
The imposition of the President‘s rule indicates a poor political scenario in a 
state.  
The main problem with a coalition government is that it is not 
necessarily stable and mere for survival of the coalition government 
development in all fields are sacrificed by the politicians. Hence a high value 
will suggest high degree of political instability. Jharkhand is politically most 
instable state having the highest value in this index which reflects the truth as 
here President‘s Rule was imposed for 2 times and 9 times CM headed a 
coalition government during 2004-11.West Bengal is politically most stable 
state for this period followed by Maharashtra. 
 
Rule of Law- The index of rule of law is reflected by the proxy variable- 
T&D loss. So a higher vale will suggest more loss reflecting poor law and 
order conditions. Jharkhand has the highest value for this suggesting a very 
poor condition of law and order within the state. The lowest value is for 
Punjab stating that the law and order conditions are good followed by west 
Bengal. 
 
Creditors’ Property Rights - For index of property rights proxy is the CD-
ratio of the commercial banks across the states which are a measure of the 
differences in the degree of risk that banks face across different states in 
India. Hence more is the risk value less is the development. However, 
Jharkhand has the least value showing it is in the best condition as compared 
to the other states. 
State as a Provider of Necessary Infrastructure- A high value will reflect 
better infrastructure facilities within the state. Punjab is having the best 
European Scientific Journal   April 2014  edition vol.10, No.10   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
327 
 
infrastructure facilities followed by Maharashtra and Tamilnadu. Jharkhand 
is lagging here also though West Bengal has the least value. 
 
Fiscal Governance- A dissatisfactory fiscal scenario reflected by lower ratio 
value fails to attract and create incentives for the private economic agents to 
participate in productive economic activities. Jharkhand state‘s position is 
not comfortable. West Bengal and Punjab has one of higher values, more 
than that of Jharkhand while the lowest values is for Maharashtra Followed 
by Tamilnadu. 
 
Economic Freedom- The economic freedom is reflected by CD-Ratio which 
is the regarded as effectiveness of credit delivery system. However the ratio 
is significantly influenced by the overall credit delivery environment and 
banks‘ lending policy. A higher ratio value indicates more State intervention 
in the economy and there is a greater scope for corruption and other kinds of 
rent-seeking activities. The indices values suggest that Jharkhand has the 
highest value followed by West Bengal. Punjab has the least value showing 
its high economic development. 
As suggested by indices values, Jharkhand state is lagging in most of 
the components of institutions like legal efficiency, political stability, rule of 
law, state infrastructure and economic freedom. However it is in a better 
condition as far as institutions like property rights and fiscal governance is 
considered. It can be concluded that Jharkhand- a resource rich state of India 
which is widely acclaimed as the region of the future, having immense 
potential for industrialisation with its large deposits of minerals, is lagging in 
almost all the components of institutions and hence needs to focus on the 
development of a good quality institutions which plays a significant role in 
explaining the economic development. 
   
Discussion of the results and conclusion 
From the results it may be concluded that institutions do play a 
significant role in explaining the economic performance as well as the 
industrial development across the states under consideration.  
However if political stability, rule of law and state as a provider of 
necessary infrastructure are removed from the analysis then property rights 
emerge as a significant factor influencing the economic development. This 
suggests that while institutional qualities play a strong role in economic 
development but are overshadowed by quality of governance e.g. political 
stability, rule of law and state as a provider of necessary infrastructure. 
The measure of quality of governance as the political stability has a 
very strong effect on the economic performance. It is assumed that a state 
with low political stability where there is a rule of coalition govt, face a lot of 
European Scientific Journal   April 2014  edition vol.10, No.10   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
328 
difficulties in implementing the policies since the political interests of 
different political parties don‘t match.  All the policies and development are 
sacrificed only for survival of a coalition government, and enjoying their 
own political benefits and thus the government works for its own interests 
rather than in the interests of the people at large. However, this is tested by a 
proxy variable in this analysis and cannot be controlled by any policy. 
The other measure of the quality of governance is the fiscal 
governance, which also plays an important role. States that spend more on 
developmental expenditures compared to non developmental expenditures 
have enjoyed a better level of economic development. The question of why 
the governments in some states have allocated a lower percentage of 
developmental expenditures cannot be answered by this analysis. 
 
The Policy Orientation 
From a policy perspective it may be noted that the states should 
spend on developmental expenditures rather than on non-development 
expenditures. Low quality of institutions would create a lot of obstacles in 
realizing the true potential of the states and must not be ignored. The 
development of the states depends heavily on how efficiently resources are 
used which is further determined by the quality of governance and the 
existing policy environment.  
Good governance affects the growth and development in manifolds. 
First, it affects the efficiency of the public and private sector developmental 
programmes in the state. Poor administration and mismanagement are now 
widely accepted as the factors reducing the effectiveness of many 
government programmes. The general ‗law and order‘ –broadly covered by 
‗rule of law‘ and ‗legal efficiency‘ is highly responsible factor of governance 
which creates an environment conducive to investment. A better rule of law 
and faster disposal rates by courts and police would certainly have a positive 
impact on the development of the states. The result of good governance will 
facilitate the infrastructure development which itself is the welcoming door 
for many other developments in various sectors. 
Another channel through which the growth of the state can be 
stimulated using the quality of governance at the state level is by making the 
policy environment more business friendly. A new entrepreneur setting of an 
industrial unit needs thirty separate permissions from different departments 
responsible for state level clearances, e.g. those related to environment 
regulations, utilities, health, sanitary and safety inspection, labour welfare 
regulation, sales tax, etc. The positive development in recent times is that 
many states have taken initiatives in this area and have introduced simplified 
procedures and single-window arrangements to improve the business 
climate. However these are very recent initiatives and the lead has been 
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taken only by the better performing states. Such type of reforms in the 
regulatory system is highly needed for the speedy development of the states.  
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ANNEXURE-I 
Table:1.4 : Correlation Matrix, before applying Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent probability levels 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 AVG_DI
SPO 
PRESI_
R 
COALI
_G 
TDLO
SS CD_R 
SUR_RO
AD 
TELE_
HH 
REV_E
XP 
INT_P
AY 
TOTAL_
EXP 
AVG_DI
SPO 
1 
- 
         
PRESI_R .136 
(.518) 
1 
- 
        
COALI_
G 
-.137 
(.514) 
.556
**
 
(.004) 
1 
- 
       
TDLOSS -.187 
(.371) 
.402
*
 
(.046) 
.625
**
 
(.001) 
1 
- 
      
CD_R .586
**
 
(.002) 
.034 
(.872) 
-.074 
(.723) 
-.253 
(.223) 
1 
- 
     
SUR_RO
AD 
-.885
**
 
(.000) 
-.218 
(.295) 
.071 
(.736) 
.065 
(.758) 
-.547
**
 
(.005) 
1 
- 
    
TELE_H
H 
.514
*
 
(.010) 
-.370 
(.075) 
-.489
*
 
(.015) 
-.728
**
 
(.000) 
.214 
(.315) 
-.389 
(.061) 
1 
- 
   
REV_EX
P 
.154 
(.462) 
.021 
(.920) 
.116 
(.581) 
-.028 
(.894) 
-.161 
(.442) 
-.146 
(.486) 
.332 
(.113) 
1 
- 
  
INT_PA
Y 
.074 
(.725) 
-.050 
(.814) 
-.083 
(.693) 
-.183 
(.380) 
-.172 
(.412) 
-.091 
(.667) 
.238 
(.264) 
.875
**
 
(.000) 
1 
- 
 
TOTAL_
EXP 
.153 
(.466) 
.016 
(.941) 
.100 
(.634) 
-.041 
(.845) 
-.166 
(.428) 
-.147 
(.482) 
.329 
(.116) 
.999
**
 
(.000) 
.895
**
 
(.000) 
1 
- 
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Abbreviations;  AVG_DISPO, Average Disposal rate of cases per court;  PRESI_R, number 
of times the President‘s Rule was  imposed; COALI_G, number of times the CM headed a 
coalition form of  government; TDLOSS, Transmission & Distribution Loss as a percentage 
of generation; CD_R, credit-deposit ratio of commercial banks across the states;  
SUR_ROAD, ratio of surfaced roads to total roads; TELE_HH, percentage of population 
accessing telephone connections; REV_EXP, revenue expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure; INT_PAY, interest payment as a percentage of total expenditure;TOTAL_EXP, 
ratio of total expenditure as percentage of total state gross domestic product (SGDP) 
 
ANNEXURE-I- continued 
Table 1.5: Weights Assigned after applying PCA 
 
Rescaled Component 
 
1 2 3 
AVG_DISPO .853 .233 .214 
PRESI_R .055 -.238 .513 
COALI_G -.166 -.315 .363 
TDLOSS -.317 -.489 .522 
CD_R .889 -.379 -.245 
SUR_ROAD -.866 -.187 -.460 
TELE_HH .477 .781 -.383 
REV_EXP .037 .553 .049 
INT_PAY -.014 .486 .096 
TOTAL_EXP .034 .557 .059 
Statistics    
Eigenvalues 2.531 1.816 1.522 
Percentage of variance 
extracted (Cumulative) 
59.4 81.4 93.8 
Abbreviations;  AVG_DISPO, Average Disposal rate of cases per court;  PRESI_R, number 
of times the President‘s Rule was  imposed ;  COALI_G, number of times the CM headed a 
coalition form of  government  ;  TDLOSS, Transmission & Distribution Loss as a 
percentage of generation  ;  CD_R, credit-deposit ratio of commercial banks across the states 
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;  SUR_ROAD, ratio of surfaced roads to total roads  ;  TELE_HH, percentage of population 
accessing telephone connections  ;  REV_EXP, revenue expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure ;  INT_PAY, interest payment as a percentage of total expenditure  ;  
TOTAL_EXP, ratio of total expenditure as percentage of total state gross domestic product 
(SGDP) 
ANNEXURE-I- continued 
Table 1.6: Correlation Matrix, after applying Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) 
 
I_LEG_
EFFI 
I_POLI_S
TAB 
I_RULE_
LAW 
I_PROP_RI
GHT 
I_STATE_I
NFRA 
I_FISC_
GOV 
I_ECON_F
RDM 
I_LEG_EFFI 1 
- 
      
I_POLI_ST
AB 
.066 
(.753) 
1 
- 
     
I_RULE_LA
W 
-.186 
(.373) 
.528
**
 
(.007) 
1 
- 
    
I_PROP_RI
GHT 
.586
**
 
(.002) 
-.023 
(.911) 
-.253 
(.223) 
1 
- 
   
I_STATE_I
NFRA 
-.745
**
 
.000 
-.340 
(.096) 
-.240 
(.248) 
-.476
*
 
(.016) 
1 
- 
  
I_FISC_GO
V 
.132 
(.529) 
.042 
(.843) 
-.078 
(.711) 
-.169 
(.420) 
-.039 
(.853) 
1 
- 
 
I_ECON_FR
DM 
.152 
(.469) 
.070 
(.739) 
-.041 
(.845) 
-.166 
(.428) 
-.053 
(.802) 
.994
**
 
.000 
1 
- 
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Notes: Figures in parentheses represent probability levels 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Abbreviations :  I_LEG_EFFI ,Index of Legal Efficiency; I_POLI_STAB, Index of Political 
Stability; I_RULE_LAW, Index of Rule of Law;  I_PROP_RIGHT, Index of Creditors‘ 
Property Rights; I_STATE_INFRA, Index of State as a provider of necessary 
Infrastructures;  I_FISC_GOV, Index of Fiscal Governance;  I_ECON_FRDM, Index of 
Economic Freedom 
ANNEXURE-II 
VARIABLES, DATA SOURCES AND TIME PERIOD 
Table  2.1. Variable list for the index of Legal Efficiency 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Average disposal rates of 
cases per court 
Crime in India, ,National 
Crime Records Bureau 
(NCRB),2011 
2004-11 
Table  2.2. Variable list for the index of Political Stability 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Number of times the 
President‘s Rule was 
imposed 
D.D.Basu,Introduction to the 
Constitution of India,21
st
 
Edition 
2013 
2.Number of times a 
coalition government was 
formed 
India, Statistical Reports on 
General Elections to the State 
Legislative Assemblies(New 
Delhi: Election Commission of 
India,2011) 
2004-11 
Table  2.3. Variable list for the Rule of Law 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Percentage of transmission 
and distribution (T&D) 
losses 
India, Annual Report (2011-
12) on the Working of State 
Electricity Boards & 
Electricity Departments, 
Power and Energy Division 
(New Delhi, Planning 
Commission, October 2011) 
 
2004-11 
Table  2.4. Variable list for creditors‘ Property Rights Protection 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Credit-deposit ratio of 
scheduled commercial banks 
per 1 000 population (in tens 
of millions of rupees). 
 
 
India, Report on Trend and 
Progress of Banking in India 
(Mumbai: Reserve Bank of 
India, 2012) 
 
 
2004-11 
Table  2.5. Variable list for the index of the State as a provider of necessary 
Infrastructures 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Surfaced roads as a 
proportion of total roads 
India, Statistical Abstract, 
India 2011,Ministry of 
2004-11 
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Statistics and Programme 
Implementation (New Delhi, 
Controlled Publications,2012) 
2.Percentage of households 
that have access to a 
telephone 
 2004-11 
 
Table  2.6. Variable list for the index of Fiscal Governance 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Interest payment as a 
percentage of total 
expenditure 
India, State Finances: A 
Study of State Budgets 
(Mumbai, Reserve Bank of 
India, 2011-12) 
 
2004-11 
2.Revenue expenditure as a 
percentage of total 
expenditure 
India, State Finances: A 
Study of State Budgets 
(Mumbai, Reserve Bank of 
India, 2011-12) 
 
2004-11 
Table  2.7. Variable list for the index of Economic Freedom 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Total government 
expenditure as a percentage 
of SGDP 
India, State Finances: A 
Study of State Budgets 
(Mumbai, Reserve Bank of 
India, 2011-12) 
 
2004-11 
Abbreviation: SGDP, State Gross Domestic Product 
Table  2.8. Variable list for Development and Growth Indicators 
Variables Data Sources Years 
1. Per Capita Income MOSPI Report on selected 
socio-economic statistics, 
India 2011 
 
2004-11 
2.SGDP Growth Rates India, State Finances: A 
Study of State Budgets 
(Mumbai, Reserve Bank of 
India, 2011-12) 
 
2004-11 
3. Level of Industrialisation Percentage Share of 
Secondary Sector in SGDP 
Growth, Central Statistical 
Organisation (CSO)& 
Ministry of Industry, 
Government of India, 2013, 
 
2004-11 
Abbreviation: SGDP, State Gross Domestic Product 
 
